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WHAT CAN WE DEMAND OF JUDGES INRETURN FOR INDEPENDENCE?
DAVID KLEIN*

The focus of this Essay is the intersection of two propositions widely
accepted among legal practitioners and scholars in the United States. The first,
empirical, proposition is that indeterminacy in the law allows judges' policy
views to affect their decisions in significant ways. Few observers today would
seriously dispute the claim that judges "sometimes are influenced by their
political and moral views and their personal biases." The second, normative,
proposition is that society is best served by having judges who are highly
independent in the sense that they need not fear losing their jobs as a result of
decisions that displease certain audiences. Although there are prominent
advocates of constraints on independence such as judicial elections, it is my
sense that sentiment in the legal community leans much more strongly toward
freeing judges of these constraints.
Common though these beliefs may be, they do not coexist harmoniously in a
political system where democratic self-rule is taken seriously-the more widely
the first proposition holds, the more it undermines the second. A central
principle of our political system is that individuals are not entitled to impose
their policy views on other people unless they are authorized to do so by, and
answerable to, those same people. This principle is not absolute, but exceptions
to it must be carefully justified. As I understand the most popular and powerful
justifications of judicial independence, they do not rest on claims that judges are
wiser than other people or otherwise more likely to make good policy choices.
Rather, they rest on claims that legal texts and principles are more likely to guide
judges when the resulting decisions are unpalatable and likely to be unpopular.
Accordingly, arguments for independence are weaker the less that judges are
able to divorce their readings of the law from their personal preferences.
One way to resolve the tension between the two propositions is to weaken
the second-given that judges are sometimes influenced by their policy
preferences, they should enjoy only some freedom from accountability. This is
in fact the option chosen by most U.S. states; unlike Article III federal judges,

*
Associate Professor, Woodrow Wilson Department of Politics, University of Virginia. I
am grateful to Jamil Jaffer, Emily Pronin, Richard West, and the South CarolinaLaw Review's
editorial staff for valuable feedback.
1. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JuDGING 6 (2010). Tamanaha presents overwhelming evidence that this understanding
of judges' behavior has been much more widespread across American legal history than is
commonly thought. See id. at 132-155.
2. See CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
18 (2009) ("[D]emocratic politics in the form of state supreme court elections is flourishing and
should be fostered rather than impaired.").
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the vast majority of state judges have renewable terms of set length, and most
must face voters to stay in office. 3
This Essay takes a different approach to resolving the tension. In my view,
arguments for independence are very strong, especially those arguments
emphasizing the protection of unpopular litigants. Even if I were inclined to
dispute them, there is not enough space in this Essay to do so adequately.
Hence, I will simply assume that the system in place for federal judges is
defensible. Further, I readily concede that human judges cannot reasonably be
expected to purge the influence of personal views from all of their decisions.
But it does not follow from either or both of these concessions that we must
simply accept whatever judges give us. Quite the contrary, I think it perfectly
appropriate to place heavy demands on judges in return for freedom from
accountability.
For readers who balk at this statement, an analogy to another group of
professionals with extraordinary job security might be useful. Instructors of
undergraduate constitutional law classes often require students to write mock
briefs or opinions in response to a real or hypothetical case. Imagine that a series
of careful studies found consistent evidence that liberal professors tended to give
somewhat higher grades to papers expressing liberal viewpoints, while
conservative professors tended to give somewhat higher grades to conservative
papers. Presumably, this would not precipitate a large-scale movement to
abolish tenure, but the finding surely would be met with more than a shrugged,
"Oh well, professors are human." We would expect professors to acknowledge
the existence of a problem and take steps to address it. Judges, whose decisions
are much more consequential, should be held to at least as high a standard.
What should we demand of largely unaccountable judges? I offer two
suggestions. First, we should demand that they engage in intensive, sustained
efforts to ensure that personal views do not exert undue influence4 on their
decisions. 5 Second, we should demand from judges more candid information
about their policy preferences and moral views. If nothing else, nominees for
federal judgeships should be required to answer questions about their policy
preferences at their confirmation hearings.

3. See Methods of JudicialSelection, AM. JUDICATURE Soc., http://www.judicialselection.
us/judicial selection/methods/selection ofjudges.cfin (last visited Feb. 17, 2011).
4. What constitutes "undue influence" is concededly an important, difficult question. I do
not attempt to answer it here. For the purposes of this Essay, it is enough to posit widespread
agreement that personal views should have a quite limited influence on judges' decisions and that it
is at least plausible that this influence could be more limited than it now is.
5. This is far from an original idea. In fact, one could understand the prescriptive literature
on methods of legal (especially constitutional) interpretation over the last several decades as a vast
effort to resolve the tension by guiding judges' behavior. I take no position on whether that effort
may eventually bear fruit, but at this point there is too little consensus about appropriate methods to
offer the necessary guidance. Instead, my aim here is to suggest methods that should be equally
acceptable to those with different ideologies or philosophies ofjudging.
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Before developing these suggestions, let me clarify the assumptions
underlying my argument. There are two empirical assumptions that I believe are
uncontroversial and ask the reader to accept without much discussion of
supporting evidence. First, a nontrivial fraction of all court cases present
questions allowing for more than one plausible answer under accepted legal
methods.6 Typically, such cases make up a larger chunk of the docket in higher
courts than in lower ones. Second, in these types of cases, there is a strong
tendency for judges' decisions to match the positions they prefer on extralegal
grounds.
Note that the second assumption does not imply that judges intentionally
choose positions on the basis of personal preference, or even that they are aware
of a relationship between their preferences and their decisions; nor does it imply
that they decide carelessly. It is fully consistent with an assumption-probably
correct, in my view-that judges typically make serious efforts to find the most
legally compelling answer, regardless of their own preferences. It just holds
that, if this is what judges are trying to do, they do not always succeed.
Note, too, that I employ terms such as "personal views" and "preferences"
loosely here. Personal views may be based on beliefs about morality, efficacious
public policy, or other related issues. For the purposes of this Essay, it is enough
to define these views as idiosyncratic and independent of the substance of legal
materials such as statutes and precedents.
Nor do I take a position on the difficult question of the extent to which legal
interpretation can proceed without reference to moral or policy principles.
Bearing in mind that my concern here is not judging generally, but rather the
decisionmaking of judges who do not have to answer for their decisions, the
argument rests on just two normative assumptions. First, unaccountable judges
should put their personal views aside where traditional legal methods of analysis
point largely in the direction of a single answer to a legal question. Second, even
where more than one answer is plausible, judges are not entitled to choose a
position on the ground that it is intuitively appealing; rather, their obligation is to
determine what position is best. "Best" may be defined in different ways, and of
course the most intuitively appealing option will usually strike judges as best.
But reasonable judges will also recognize that they may be wrong-that their

6.

See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 111-31.

More than a hundred years ago, Wilbur

Larremore wrote in the Yale Law Journal: "In this condition of affairs judges indulge in the
delusion that they are observing stare decisis merely because they cite precedents. The truth is that
. . . judicial precedents may be found for any proposition that a counsel, or a court, wishes
established, or to establish." Wilbur Larremore, Judicial Legislation in New York, 14 YALE L.J.
312, 317-18 (1909).
7. The literature supporting this claim is far too vast to do it justice here. For a highly
influential work focusing on the ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). For

a thorough overview of the relationship between judges' political party affiliations and votes on
many different courts, see Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American
Courts:A Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999).
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predispositions may lead them astray-and so must test the logic of a preferred
position against its main competitors in the fullest, fairest way.
I.

SEEKING OUT DISAGREEMENT

The trouble, as both personal experience and psychological studies tell us, is
that this can be very hard to do. Humans show a marked tendency to engage in
cognitive processes that-while helpful for taking us through ordinary daily
activities with minimal effort-let us down when we confront difficult reasoning
tasks.8 Psychologists have identified a great many such processes, often referred
to as "biases." 9 A number of these biases relate to the topic of this Essay, but
one, "confirmation bias," is particularly relevant.
"Confirmation bias" refers to "the inappropriate bolstering of hypotheses or
beliefs whose truth is in question . . . [through] unwitting selectivity in the

acquisition and use of evidence." 10 If we begin a reasoning process leaning
toward a certain position, we display confirmation bias when we inappropriately
pay more attention to and give more weight to evidence favoring that position
than evidence casting doubt on it."
In close cases, judges subject to
confirmation bias will tend to see the policy positions they prefer as better
supported by precedent, historical evidence, text, and so on.
Some instances of confirmation bias can be understood as manifestations of
a more general phenomenon known as motivated reasoning. In a seminal article,
Professor Ziva Kunda explained that both accuracy goals-to reach correct
answers regardless of what they are-and directional goals-to reach particular
answers regardless of whether they are correct-can motivate reasoning.12
When a directional goal exerts more force than an accuracy goal, reasonerswhile not feeling free to reach any conclusion just because it is appealing (the
accuracy goal still exerts some force)-will "search memory for those beliefs
and rules that could support their desired conclusion." 13 When motivated
reasoning is at work, people may feel that they are reasoning objectively, but this
objectivity "is illusory because people do not realize that the process is biased by
their goals, that they are accessing only a subset of their relevant knowledge,
[and] that they would probably access different beliefs and rules in the presence
of different directional goals."

8.

See Hal R. Arkes, Costs and Benefits of Judgment Errors: Implications for Debiasing,

110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 486, 486 (1991).
9.
For a categorization and partial catalogue of cognitive processes, see id. at 487-92.
10. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,
2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
11. See id.
12. Ziva Kunda, The Casefor MotivatedReasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 480, 480 (1990).
13. Id. at 4 83.
14. Id.
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I am not aware of any direct evidence showing the operation of confirmation
bias or motivated reasoning in judicial decisionmaking, but there is abundant
reason to think they are present there. Professor Eileen Braman has employed
creative experiments to show that law students engage in motivated reasoningfor instance, policy preferences influence their assessments of similarities
between precedential and hypothetical cases and of litigants' standing to bring
suit.15 Across a series of experimental studies, Dean Chris Guthrie, Professor
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Judge Andrew J. Wistrich have convincingly
demonstrated that judges tend to exhibit the same biases as other people in
completing reasoning tasks. 1 6 None of these experimental studies involve
decisionmaking in actual cases. However, the scope of the findings makes it
difficult to believe that judges can shed all biases upon ascending to the bench.
Furthermore, in a discussion of what he calls "coherence based reasoning,"
Professor Dan Simon points to a phenomenon that anyone who reads judicial
opinions regularly encounters:
The facts[,] . . . precedents, [and other considerations] all come together

in a coherent whole to make for the inevitable and undeniably correct
result. The sense of correctness is bolstered by the dearth or absence of
arguments to the contrary. By the culmination of the opinion, one might
wonder how the decision could be considered to have been anything but
obvious in the first place. This sense of obviousness, however, quickly
dissolves upon turning to the opinion of the dissenting judges.
Dissenting opinions too tend to be strongly coherent and persuasive ....
Thus, while the opinions are exceedingly coherent internally, they are
radically inconsistent with a slew of seemingly plausible arguments
contained in the opposing opinion.18

15.

EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION 83-140 (2009).

16. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93

CORNELL L. REv. 1, 43 (2007) ("[J]udges, like everyone else, have two cognitive systems for
making judgments-the intuitive and the deliberative-and the intuitive system appears to have a
powerful effect on judges' decision making."); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of DeliberatelyDisregarding,153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251,

1330-31 (2005) ("The presumption that people can ignore what they know, or use it for some
purposes but not for other purposes, may sometimes be true, but often is little more than a
convenient fiction. This may mean that judicial decision making is not as accurate as we hope it is."
(citation omitted)). See generally Birte Englich, Blind or Biased? Justitia's Susceptibility to
Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom Based on Given Numerical Representations, 28 LAW & POL'Y

497, 511 (2006) ("[B]asic insights about the psychological mechanisms of human judgment may
help to decide what is fair in a court of law.").
17. Dan Simon, In Praise of Pedantic Eclecticism: Pitfalls and Opportunities in the
Psychology of Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 131, 134 (David

Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
18. Id. at 138.
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Assuming that these one-sided opinions are not always the result of rhetorical
strategy, they provide more evidence that even judges committed to accurate
decisionmaking can stack the deck.
This discussion of concepts is less rigorous than it ideally would be; despite
my conflation of them, confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, and coherence
based reasoning are not synonymous. However, for purposes of this Essay, it is
enough to highlight an insight common to all-despite judges' best intentions,
intellectual precommitments such as moral views and policy preferences will
often exert a powerful influence on the direction their reasoning takes.
As already noted, these insights are not available to us only through the
research of psychologists; they also come from daily observation of ourselves
and others. Given their legal training and experience evaluating the positions of
others, judges might be expected to be particularly aware of the dangers. And
so, a critical reader could argue that there is little reason to be concerned about
the effects on judges' decisionmaking. This argument would run up against
other work in psychology, however. For instance, little evidence exists to show
that mere awareness of the possibility of bias is sufficient to eliminate it. 19 More
fundamentally, recognizing human beings' general susceptibility to bias does not
necessarily entail recognizing one's own susceptibility. In a series of studies,
Professor Emily Pronin and her colleagues have demonstrated a strong tendency
of people to believe that biases affect others' reasoning more than their own.
They see this "bias blind spot" 2 1 as arising from a tendency to "over-value
thoughts, feelings, and other mental contents, relative to behavior, when
assessing their own actions, motives, and preferences, but not when assessing
others." We know that we wish to be unbiased, so we credit those wishes in
the face of contrary evidence; we do not have the same access to or trust in
others' introspections, so in their cases we give more weight to objective
indications of bias.
I can think of no good reason to imagine that judges are less prone to this
blind spot than anyone else. In fact, one might suppose that the trappings of
office and deference from others that come with judgeships exacerbate the
problem-though that is admittedly just speculation. Certainly, when we
consider the plethora of cases where the majority and dissenting writers accuse
each other of reading personal preferences into the law instead of following their

19. See Scott 0. Lilienfeld et al., Giving DebiasingAway: Can PsychologicalResearch on
Correcting Cognitive Errors Promote Human Welfare?, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. ScI. 390, 394-95

(2009).
20. See Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The
Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 565
(2007); Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369 (2002).

21. Pronin & Kugler, supra note 20, at 566.
22.

Id. at 566.
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example and applying the law faithfully,23 it would seem rash to assume that
judges have any special immunity.
The upshot of this discussion is that it is unreasonable to ask those governed
by the decisions of unaccountable judges to accept "trust us" as a response to the
threat of unduly influential personal views. Rather, we should demand that
judges take active measures to counteract the threat, at least where doing so
would not cause excessive delay or otherwise negatively affect their
decisionmaking.
What exactly should judges do? Unfortunately, here psychology is less
helpful, as researchers so far have had only limited success in identifying
24
Nevertheless, both common wisdom and some
practices that reduce bias.
research evidence 2 5 point to the importance of forcing oneself to take seriously
the possibility that one's own ideas are incorrect-what Baron has influentially
termed "actively open-minded thinking." 26 Of course, judges are routinely
exposed to competing arguments from the parties to a case, but this is not
enough. It is too easy for us to discount one set of arguments while telling
ourselves that we are being evenhanded. The effort needs to be more active and
less self-trusting. Judges should actively seek out disagreement and opinions
from people committed to very different views.
Before proceeding, let me be clear that this recommendation applies only to
situations where judges have time for deliberation. Especially in a trial court,
some decisions-such as rulings on objections or certain motions-must come
very quickly. We do not want trial judges to slow proceedings to a crawl or tie
themselves in knots. It is worth noting, though, that a habit of seeking out
disagreement-cultivated at appropriate times-could prove helpful to one's
reasoning even in those instances where the decision must come right away.
The best opportunities for extensive feedback will usually come from a
judge's clerks, those legal professionals who spend the greatest amount of time

23. See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 1470 n.9 (2009) (Justice Stevens's
"personal view of the purposes underlying the [statute] ... is not embodied within the statute's text.
Accordingly, it is not the statutory text that [he] has sought to vindicate-it is instead his own
'preference' for mandatory judicial review, which he disguises as a search for congressional
purpose."); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Because I do not
believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions
of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court
and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.").
24. See Lilienfield et al., supranote 19, at 391.
25. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for
Social Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239 (1984) (finding that subjects

asked to evaluate an empirical study were better able to overcome bias when prompted to imagine
that the study had come to the opposite conclusion); Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West,
Reasoning Independently of Prior Belief and Individual Differences in Actively Open-Minded
Thinking, 89 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 342, 351-52 (1997) (concluding that subjects with more openminded thinking dispositions were better at judging the strength of an argument by its quality rather
than its consistency with their views).
26.

JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 199-266 (4th ed. 2008).
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in close proximity to them.27 Especially if judges make it clear that their clerks
are expected to speak their minds, critical feedback from clerks can offer judges
excellent tests of the soundness of their reasoning and their success in avoiding
bias. 28
For this reason, it is distressing to find a pronounced and growing tendency
for United States Supreme Court Justices with particular ideological leanings to
choose their clerks from circuit judges with similar leanings.
Few practices
could be better designed to reinforce the Justices' biases and promote one-sided
reasoning. Viewed from the perspective laid out in this Essay, it is a poor
practice. In fact, not only should judges avoid seeking out clerks who share their
predispositions, they should actively seek clerks inclined to disagree with them.
Judges can get critical feedback even from ideologically sympathetic clerks, but
criticisms from people who genuinely disagree are likely to be more powerful
and better tests of the soundness of a judge's arguments.
In making this suggestion, I do not mean to downplay judges' need for
clerks they can work with easily and can trust to draft opinions that accurately
reflect their views. Certainly it is reasonable on these grounds for judges to shy
away from closed-minded clerks from the opposite camp, but I have trouble
thinking of a good reason to resist hiring thoughtful and undogmatic clerks
whose views differ from theirs. Insofar as judges resist hiring such clerks, I
would guess that it is usually because they-like everyone else-are more
comfortable being around people who think like them. But that is not a reason
that the rest of us should be expected to respect. Judges who are unwilling to
encounter disagreement in their chambers that could make them intellectually
uncomfortable should resign their posts in favor of ones that do not involve
governing the lives of others.
Aside from clerks, court colleagues are the legal professionals most likely to
provide judges with extensive feedback. As this feedback is a type of peer
review, it might be helpful to consider academic peer review as an analogy. Peer
review of submissions to scholarly journals and book publishers, required in
most fields, grows from scholars' acknowledgment of their own biases and
tendency to make mistakes. Of course peer review does not work perfectly in

27.

See generally Rick A. Swanson & Stephen L. Wasby, Good Stewards: Law Clerk

Influence in State High Courts, 29. JUST. SYs. J. 24, 25 (2008) ("The law clerk-appellate court
judge relationship is an intimate working one, in which the primary intended function of the clerk is
to research the facts and the law involved in a case, make recommendations to the judge regarding
the proper outcome of the case, and then often draft the court's opinion in the case.").
28.

See generally Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical JudicialOpinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL

ETHICS 237, 305 (2008) ("Keeping an open dialogue with the clerk ensures that the clerk is free to
express views about the opinion, even when the clerk disagrees with the judge. If the clerk happens
to be correct, then an open relationship will foster a better opinion." (citation omitted) (citing
Douglas K. Norman, Legal Staff and the Dynamics of Appellate Decision Making, 84 JUDICATURE

175, 177 (2001))).
29.

See Lawrence Baum & Corey Ditslear, Supreme Court Clerkships and "Feeder"Judges,

31 JUST. Sys. J. 26, 42-43 (2010).
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practice, but its goal-to ensure that research is not published unless other
scholars certify that it is professionally competent and trustworthy-is equally
appropriate for judges. 3 0
Judges on collegial courts already face a form of peer review-other judges
have to agree with them for their opinion to have the force of law. Still, this type
of feedback is subtly weaker than academic peer review. For one thing, in
academic peer review, scholars who are not directly engaged in the same
research project do the vetting, and so generally (though certainly not always)
they can evaluate the research more dispassionately. Unfortunately, to achieve
this level of peer review, judges would have to circulate draft opinions to jud es
not sitting on the case. Although this practice is not an unprecedented idea, it
would seem unreasonable to demand that judges make off-panel circulation and
comment a matter of routine. 32
Another aspect of academic peer review points to the possibility of a more
reasonable demand. Unless judges on one side equal or exceed the number of
judges on the other side, they cannot block the other judges' views from
becoming the official statement of the court and attaining the force of law. The
power of the dissenter in academic peer review is greater. Not every piece that
gets published is approved unanimously; certainly a poorly reasoned objection
may be disregarded. But seldom will an editor choose to publish work in the
face of a careful report claiming serious deficiencies in methods or logic. Judges
could move closer to this type of review by agreeing to give extra weight to
dissenting views in special circumstances where the dissenter makes a credible
claim that the majority's reasoning is not simply unpalatable but fundamentally
flawed-that is, that the majority's reasoning would be unpersuasive to anyone
not already committed to the majority's position for extralegal reasons. We
could ask judges to agree to an informal norm that majority writers pause and
reexamine their thinking in such circumstances, or even, on courts that do not sit
en banc, to adopt a practice of circulating opinions to other members of the
court. Naturally, success would depend in part on the discernment and good
faith of dissenting judges. But because dissenters-not having an actual vetowould have to rely on the majority's cooperation to have any impact, it would
not be in their interests to abuse this power.

30. It may enter the reader's mind at this point that this Essay has not been subjected to peer
review. Fortunately, I have thought carefully about the substance of the Essay and am less
susceptible to bias than other people are. The reader may rest assured that all the reasoning in the
Essay is sound.
31. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Building a Better Judiciary, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING, supra note 17, at 285, 294 ("A particularly

noncontroversial form of [peer] review would be to require the circulation of opinions to retired
justices for comment.").
32. Cf Guthrie et al., supra note 16, at 39 (advocating a different type of peer review where
judges from other jurisdictions evaluate a selection of previously decided cases). The practice
recommended by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich could be very beneficial for judges'
decisionmaking in general, though it does less to ensure that particular decisions are sound.
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More generally, we can ask that judges cultivate a habit of exposure in their
professional lives to forceful, intelligent statements of views that clash with their
own. For example, liberal judges could attend meetings of conservative groups
such as the Federalist Society or the Washington Legal Foundation; conservative
judges could attend meetings of liberal groups such as the American Constitution
Society or the American Civil Liberties Union. Doubtless some judges already
do this, and doubtless many judges try quite hard to reach unbiased decisions.
The point of this Essay is not to criticize judges, but to recognize that what we
legitimately seek of them-that they treat their moral and policy views with real
caution and skepticism in the course of making decisions-is very difficult to
achieve. Actively seeking out disagreement may help judges to do this more
successfully.
II. FRANK DISCLOSURE OF PERSONAL VIEWS

Obviously, not everyone will agree with the preceding proposals. Even if
judges accepted them, they would be difficult to implement, and even if
implemented they could not produce entirely objective judicial decisionmaking.
It is inevitable that personal views will play some role in the decisions of even
the most conscientious judges. Now, it may be that for the average federal judge
this seldom happens-perhaps in just a few cases per year. It may even be true
that in most cases where personal views play a major role it is appropriate for
them to do so. But from the perspective of the citizenry, none of this matters.
The simple fact is that hundreds, if not thousands, of decisions in federal courts
each year involve nontrivial doctrinal developments that reflect the preferences
of the deciding judge or judges. In light of this fact, there is a strong argument to
be made that nominees should disclose those preferences to the public at their
confirmation hearings. Neither senators' questions nor nominees' answers
should be restricted to vague references to nominees' "judicial philosophies."
Knowing something about nominees' moral and policy views would allow the
public to express more informed opinions to senators weighing the nominations.
Down the road, this would provide people with more data to evaluate the
operation of the federal judicial system, and would allow them to debate more
intelligently whether and how the system might be reformed.
That the public would benefit in these ways strikes me as too obvious to
require more argument or more of the reader's time. So, let us turn immediately
to the likely objection that the costs of adopting the practice would outweigh the
benefits. One possible cost is that nominees would compromise their capacity to
hear a case impartially by precommitting to a position (or at least appearing to).
In my view, Dean Robert Post and Professor Reva Siegel have already
thoroughly refuted any argument along these lines. Discussing the propriety of
asking a nominee how she would have voted in a particular case, they wrote:
From the perspective of a litigant seeking vindication of a right to
an abortion, and who is concerned about the prejudgment of her case,
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there is no pertinent difference between being judged by Justice
O'Connor, who has expressed in an authoritative opinion her view of
the merits of [Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.

Casey], and by a new Justice who has in a confirmation hearing
recounted how he would have voted in Casey had he been on the Court
at the time. Nominees who explain the grounds on which they would
have voted in an already decided case do not prejudge future cases any
more than do judges who write or join opinions in actual cases. 33
The objection would have even less force as applied to questions about moral
and policy views, precisely because such views would not be expected to carry
much weight in a judge's decisionmaking. A jud e who said he believed Casey
to be wrong in reaffirming a right to an abortion would be seen as committing
himself far more firmly than a judge who said only that he believed abortion to
be morally wrong.
A critic might respond, "You've just missed the key point. At present it is
true that moral and policy views are not expected to play a large role in judges'
decisions. But that would change if we gave these views such prominence in
confirmation hearings." I take this response to be the most powerful objection to
the proposal, and I concede that it has real force. It is conceivable that open
discussion of nominees' extralegal views would breed cynicism about judging
among the public and undermine society's respect for judges who attempt to
distinguish between what the law requires and what they would prefer to see
done.
That it is conceivable, however, does not make it probable. The objection
seems to envision confirmation hearings in which senators and nominees extol
reliance on personal views in judging, but this would almost certainly not
happen. Rather, nominees would undoubtedly accompany their answers with
repeated vows not to allow their views to influence their decisions, and there
would be admonitions from senators to the same effect.
More importantly, there is good reason to think that having judicial
nominees speak more openly about their views-far from weakening norms of
good judging-could actually reinforce them. Having revealed where they stand
on policies, judges would find it harder than they now do to account for patterns
of voting consistent with their policy stances. Assuming that they care about
their reputations among the bench and bar (or maybe more generally), they
might work harder to make sure that their decisions have an objectively strong
basis in the law. Even for judges who care only about whether their
decisionmaking is legally sound, their awareness of having publicly stated their

33.

Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial

Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 46-47 (2006), http://www.thepocket
part.org/images/pdfs/27.pdf (footnote omitted).
34. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4

526

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62: 515

views may serve to effectively remind them of what they wish to avoid in their
reasoning.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHT

The proposals outlined here, while not facetious, are offered in a spirit of
provocation, and I recognize that many readers will not be persuaded by them.
Still, I hope that we can all agree on at least the following-the reason we
provide some judges with nearly perfect job security is that we think this is the
best way to protect the interests of society, not because any individuals are
entitled to such a position. Quite the contrary, being allowed to exercise a
position of power without having to fear the loss of one's job or other serious
adverse consequences is a tremendous-and extremely rare-privilege. The rest
of us are justified in demanding a great deal of those who enjoy such a privilege,
and we should not be shy about doing so.
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